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T
O
W
I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
     he regime of innocent passage is a well-established body of customary 
international law.1 As articulated in Article 19 of the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion,2 the regime strikes a balance between the navigational interests of the 
maritime State and the protective interest of the coastal State by restricting 
the freedom of navigation of foreign-flagged ships to passages conducted in 
a manner that is not prejudicial to the coastal State’s peace, good order, or 
security.3 However, in cases where there is a dispute over sovereign entitle-
ment to a territorial sea or its outer limit, the applicability and legal effect of 
the regime are brought into question. The coastal State exercising effective 
control over the disputed waters may consider any attempt to challenge its 
sovereignty as prejudicial to its peace, good order, or security, while the con-
testing State may dispute that State’s entitlement to a territorial sea or its 
outer limit. Additionally, third States may refuse to recognize the validity of 
                                                                                                                      
1. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain 
(Qatar v. Bahr.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. Rep. 40, ¶ 223 (Mar. 16) [hereinafter Qatar v. 
Bahrain]; Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. No. 9, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 272, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.l. 
2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter LOSC]. 
3. See generally Yoshifumi Tanaka, Navigational Rights and Freedoms, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 536 (Donald R. Rothwell, Alex G. Oude 
Elferink, Karen Scott & Tim Stephens eds., 2015); William K. Agyebeng, Theory in Search 
of Practice: The Right of Innocent Passage in the Territorial Sea, 39 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL 
LAW JOURNAL 371 (2006); 1 E.D. BROWN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 
43–76 (1994); Tullio Treves, Navigation, in A HANDBOOK ON THE NEW LAW OF THE 
SEA 835, 906–40 (René-Jean Dupuy & Daniel Vignes eds., 1991); FRANCIS NGANT-
CHA, THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (1990); Jin Zu Guang, Conflicts between Foreign Ships’ Innocent 
Passage and National Security of the Coastal States, in INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION: 
ROCKS AND SHOALS AHEAD? 111 (John M. van Dyke, Lewis M. Alexander & Joseph 
R. Morgan eds., 1988); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC OR-
DER OF THE OCEANS: A CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 174–79 
(1987); Karin M. Burke & Deborah A. DeLeo, Innocent Passage and Transit Passage in the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 9 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 389 (1983); Brian Smith, Innocent Passage as a Rule of Decision: Navigation v. Environ-
mental Protection, 21 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 48 (1982); Shekhar 
Ghosh, The Legal Regime of Innocent Passage through the Territorial Sea, 20 INDIAN JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 216 (1980); GEORGE P. SMITH II, RESTRICTING THE CON-
CEPT OF FREE SEAS: MODERN MARITIME LAW RE-EVALUATED 31–54 (1980). 
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a particular claim to a territorial sea and assert freedoms of navigation and 
overflight by conducting various maritime activities in the area concerned. 
Further, the very existence of a territorial or maritime dispute may render 
sovereign entitlement to maritime claims legally invalid until the dispute is 
resolved. 
The applicability of the regime of innocent passage, and its legal effect, 
in disputed waters is an issue that plagues maritime security, particularly in 
Southeast Asia where there is a concentration of territorial and maritime dis-
putes in the South China Sea.4 Over 250 maritime features of diverse types 
(largely concentrated in the Paracel and Spratly island groups) are subject to 
competing territorial and maritime claims among Brunei, Malaysia, the Phil-
ippines, the People’s Republic of China (China), the Republic of China (Tai-
wan), and Vietnam. The tension that has arisen from these disputes is com-
pounded by the fact that the South China Sea is a busy international water-
way and maritime nations such as Australia, Japan, and the United States 
have strategic interests in ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight. In 
recent years, China’s land reclamation activities at some of the maritime fea-
tures, for example, Johnson Reef and Fiery Cross Reef,5 have attracted inter-
national criticism, with the United States in particular conducting freedom 
of navigation operations (FONOPs) to challenge China’s maritime claims 
that it considers inconsistent with international law.6 
State practice is unsettled as to whether the regime of innocent passage 
applies in disputed waters, often due to the categorical denial of the existence 
of a territorial or maritime dispute in the first place.7 In Antarctica, where 
                                                                                                                      
4. Legal issues relevant to these disputes are multi-faceted and discussed in voluminous 
literature. For an updated overview, see especially THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES AND 
THE LAW OF THE SEA (S. Jayakumar, Tommy Koh & Robert Beckman eds., 2014); NONG 
HONG, UNCLOS AND OCEAN DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH 
CHINA SEA (2012).  
5. See, e.g., In Pictures: The South China Sea Reef That Became an Island, ASIA TIMES (Jan. 3, 
2018), http://www.atimes.com/article/pictures-south-china-sea-reef-became-island/. 
6. See, e.g., Franz-Stefan Gady, South China Sea: US Navy Conducts Freedom of Navigation 
Operation, THE DIPLOMAT (Aug. 10, 2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/south-
china-sea-us-navy-conducts-freedom-of-navigation-operation/. It is important to note that 
FONOPs target multiple States to challenge maritime claims that the U.S. government 
considers excessive and invalid. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, REPORT TO 
CONGRESS: ANNUAL FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2017 (2017), 
https://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/FY17%20DOD%20FON%20Report.pdf?ver= 
2018-01-19-163418-053 [hereinafter ANNUAL FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION REPORT]. 
7. Japan, for example, adopts the official position that “[t]here exists no issue of terri-
torial sovereignty to be resolved concerning the Senkaku Islands.” Japanese Territory: About 
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territorial disputes have been suspended under the Antarctic Treaty,8 differ-
ent views have been expressed as to whether claimant States are entitled to 
establish maritime zones adjacent to the Antarctic continent areas they ef-
fectively control.9 In the South China Sea disputes, there has been confusion 
among commentators regarding the applicability of the regime of innocent 
passage.10 This confusion has further compounded the existing uncertainty 
concerning navigation in the area caused by the ambiguity of China’s legal 
position11 and the unsettled controversy of innocent passage by warships.12 
                                                                                                                      
the Senkaku Islands, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN (Apr. 13, 2016), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/. Similarly, the Republic of Korea 
adopts the official position that “[n]o territorial dispute exists regarding Dokdo, and 
therefore Dokdo is not a matter to be dealt with through diplomatic negotiations or 
judicial settlement.” The Korean Government’s Basic Position on Dokdo, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, http://dokdo.mofa.go.kr/eng/dokdo/govern-
ment_position.jsp (last visited Nov. 7, 2018). 
8. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. 
9. See U.N. Secretary-General, Question of Antarctica: Study Requested under General Assembly 
Resolution 38/77, ¶¶ 94–95, U.N. Doc. A/39/583 (Part I) (Oct. 31, 1984); Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), Recommendations in regard to the Submission Made by 
Australia on 15 November 2004, ¶¶ 4–52 (Apr. 9, 2008), http://www.un.org/depts/los/ 
clcs_new/submissions_files/aus04/Aus_Recommendations_FINAL.pdf; Id. annex II 
(containing notes from the United States, Russia, Japan, the Netherlands, Germany, and 
India refusing to recognize any State’s maritime claims to areas adjacent to the continent of 
Antarctica). 
10. See, e.g., Jonathan G. Odom, FONOPs to Preserve the Right of Innocent Passage?, THE 
DIPLOMAT (Feb. 25, 2016), https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/fonops-to-preserve-the-
right-of-innocent-passage/; Julian Ku, The US Navy’s “Innocent Passage” in the South China Sea 
May Have Actually Strengthened China’s Sketchy Territorial Claims, LAWFARE (Nov. 4, 2015), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-navys-innocent-passage-south-china-sea-may-have-
actually-strengthened-chinas-sketchy-territorial. 
11. Statement of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on China’s Territorial Sovereignty 
and Maritime Rights and Interests in the South China Sea, 15 CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 903, ¶ III (2016). See also Florian Dupuy & Pierre-Marie Dupuy, A 
Legal Analysis of China’s Historic Rights Claim in the South China Sea, 107 AMERICAN JOUR-
NAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 124 (2013); Keyuan Zou, China’s U-Shaped Line in the 
South China Sea Revisited, 43 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 
(2012); cf. Zhiguo Gao & Bing Bing Jia, The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, 
Status, and Implications, 107 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 98 (2013). 
12. See, e.g., NATALIE KLEIN, MARITIME SECURITY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 25–
43 (2011); Keyuan Zou, Innocent Passage for Warships: The Chinese Doctrine and Practice, 29 
OCEAN DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 195 (1998); Bernard H. Oxman, 
The Regime of Warships under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 24 VIRGINIA 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 809 (1984); F. David Froman, Uncharted Waters: 
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China’s regulations requiring foreign warships to give prior notification of 
their passage through its exclusive economic zone has also contributed to 
this legal conundrum.13 
These disputes reflect doctrinal uncertainty regarding the fundamental 
relationship between territorial and maritime legal regimes in the exercise of 
State sovereignty within the current framework of international law. The un-
certainty concerns whether a settlement of the territorial dispute, in accord-
ance with the traditional principle “the land dominates the sea,”14 constitutes 
a prerequisite to an entitlement to adjacent maritime zones such as territorial 
waters. If accord is required, no maritime zones can be generated while sov-
ereignty over the territory or its legal classification remains unsettled, and 
therefore the relevant maritime space remains open to freedom of navigation 
and overflight. An alternative view is that the law of the sea regime provides 
an independent legal basis for generating various maritime zones in accord-
ance with its own rules, even if sovereignty over the territory or its legal clas-
sification remains unsettled. According to the latter view, the State effectively 
controlling the disputed territory, ipso facto, exercises sovereignty over the ad-
jacent territorial sea in which the regime of innocent passage applies. 
In seeking greater clarity regarding the relationship between the territo-
rial and maritime legal regimes, this article considers the applicability of the 
regime of innocent passage and its legal effect in disputed waters by critically 
examining the relevant jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals 
that have dealt with territorial and maritime disputes. “Disputed waters” en-
compass, for the purpose of this article, three different types of maritime 
disputes: (a) those arising from competing claims of sovereignty over coastal 
land; (b) those regarding the legal classification of a maritime feature as the 
basis for establishing various maritime zones, namely, whether the feature is 
a low-tide elevation, rock, or island within the meaning of Article 121 of the 
                                                                                                                      
Non-Innocent Passage of Warships in the Territorial Sea, 21 SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 625 
(1984). 
13. See, e.g., Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, Preserving Navigational Rights and Freedoms: The Right to 
Conduct Military Activities in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone, 9 CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 9 (2010); Haiwen Zhang, Is It Safeguarding the Freedom of Navigation or Maritime 
Hegemony of the United States? – Comments on Raul (Pete) Pedrozo’s Article on Military Activities in 
the EEZ, 9 CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (2010); Ivan Shearer, Military 
Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: The Case of Aerial Surveillance, 17 OCEAN YEARBOOK 
548 (2003). 
14. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 
I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 96 (Feb. 20). See infra Part II. 
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Law of the Sea Convention;15 and (c) those arising from an excessive claim 
of maritime zones by coastal States, especially those drawing straight base-
lines with a liberal interpretation of the “general direction of the coast.”16 
These types of disputes are unique in that, unlike purely territorial disputes, 
there is inevitably an external dimension to the disputes due to the naviga-
tional interest of third parties that emerges from the application of the re-
gime of innocent passage. These disputes are also distinguished from a situ-
ation where two coastal States have an overlapping area of territorial sea en-
titlement, which raises an issue of maritime delimitation rather than the ap-
plicability of the regime of innocent passage or its legal effect. 
This article proceeds in six parts. Part II reviews the traditional principle 
of domination of the land over the sea, identifying a two-pronged legal con-
notation and the shift in emphasis of its role in maritime disputes. Part III 
assesses different legal contexts in which the applicability of the regime of 
innocent passage may be challenged in each of the three different types of 
disputed waters as categorized above. Part IV examines the meaning of inno-
cent passage to the extent that this regime purportedly applies in disputed 
waters, and introduces the concept of opposability as a legal tool to help clar-
ify the legal effect of the regime of innocent passage when it is applied in 
disputed waters. The findings from this analysis then are critically evaluated 
from a legal policy perspective, with a particular focus on their potential im-
pact on the maintenance of international peace and security—one of the fun-
damental purposes of the UN Charter.17 Part VI concludes by identifying how 
and to what extent the regime of innocent passage will be found opposable, 
specifically in each of the three types of disputed waters, while also highlight-
ing doctrinal uncertainties that will remain and that will continue to provide 
legal incentives for States to resort to unilateral acts of self-help. 
 
                                                                                                                      
15. A low-tide elevation is defined as “a naturally formed area of land which is 
surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at high tide.” LOSC, supra 
note 2, art. 13. An island, on the other hand, is defined as “a naturally formed area of 
land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.” Id. art. 121(1). However, 
no entitlement to an exclusive economic zone or a continental shelf is generated from 
“rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own.” Id. art. 
121(3). The legal regime of islands reflects customary international law. See Qatar v. 
Bahrain, supra note 1, ¶ 185. 
16. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 7(3). See generally J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, 
EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS (3d ed. 2012). 
17. U.N. Charter art. 1(1). 
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II. THE PRINCIPLE OF DOMINATION OF THE LAND OVER THE SEA 
 
The development of the law of the sea has, at critical junctures, hinged upon 
the nexus between land territory and the ocean.18 In particular, the regime of 
innocent passage has evolved through the tension between the analogical 
extension of property theories to the territorial sea and the medieval notions 
of freedom of passage.19 The principle that “the land dominates the sea” has 
indeed been considered as inherent in the nature of the territorial sea. In the 
Fisheries case, the International Court of Justice referred to “the close de-
pendence of the territorial sea upon the land domain,”20 observing: 
 
It is the land which confers upon the coastal State a right to waters off its 
coasts. It follows that while such a State must be allowed the latitude nec-
essary in order to be able to adapt its delimitation to practical needs and 
local requirements, the drawing of base-lines must not depart to any appre-
ciable extent from the general direction of the coast.21 
 
This finding establishes that the legal connotation of this principle, as it ap-
plies to the territorial sea, is twofold: first, an entitlement to maritime zones 
derives from the territorial sovereignty of the coastal State;22 second, geo-
graphical factors cannot be ignored in determining the direction and extent 
of maritime zones. 
                                                                                                                      
18. For a discussion of this nexus in the development of the law of the sea, see 
Bing Bing Jia, The Principle of the Domination of the Land over the Sea: A Historical Perspective 
on the Adaptability of the Law of the Sea to New Challenges, 57 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2014); PROSPER WEIL, THE LAW OF MARITIME DELIMITATION: 
REFLECTIONS 51–56 (Maureen MacGlashan trans., 1989). For differences between the two 
legal regimes, see Lea Brilmayer & Natalie Klein, Land and Sea: Two Sovereignty Regimes in 
Search of a Common Denominator, 33 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND POLITICS 703 (2001). 
19. See especially 1 D.P. O’CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 259–
74 (Ivan A. Shearer ed., 1982). 
20. Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 116, 133 (Dec. 18).  
21. Id. 
22. Sir Arnold McNair, in his dissenting opinion, emphatically explains the legal nature 
of attribution of the territorial sea as follows: 
To every State whose land territory is at any place washed by the sea, international law 
attaches a corresponding portion of maritime territory consisting of what the law calls ter-
ritorial waters . . . . International law does not say to a State: “You are entitled to claim 
territorial waters if you want them.” No maritime State can refuse them. International law 
imposes upon a maritime State certain obligations and confers upon it certain rights arising 
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The first thesis of the principle of domination of the land over the sea 
prescribes the subordinate character of maritime zones to the territorial title 
of a sovereign State for legal attribution, meaning the former may not exist 
without the latter. The arbitral tribunal in Grisbadarna endorsed this view, 
which Norway presented and to which Sweden did not object, concerning 
the maritime boundaries drawn by the Peace of Roskilde of 1658, stating: 
 
[T]hat opinion is in conformity with the fundamental principles of the law 
of nations, both ancient and modern, in accordance with which the mari-
time territory is an essential appurtenance of land territory, whence it fol-
lows that at the time when, in 1658, the land territory called the Bohuslän 
was ceded to Sweden, the radius of maritime territory constituting an in-
separable appurtenance of this land territory must have automatically 
formed a part of that cession . . . .23 
 
Similarly, in the Beagle Channel arbitration, a reference was made to “an over-
riding general principle of law that, in the absence of express provision to 
the contrary, an attribution of territory must ipso facto carry with it the wa-
ters appurtenant to the territory attributed.”24 
Arguments to the contrary have been dismissed. In Minquiers and Ecrehos, 
the French government pleaded that these islets formed part of a maritime 
zone that was closely dependent upon the (European) continent from geo-
logical, geographical, and historical points of view.25 Judge Levi Carneiro in 
his individual opinion expressly dismissed this argument, stating, “[t]he un-
ion of the islands with the Continent is a geographical hypothesis having no 
                                                                                                                      
out of the sovereignty which it exercises over its maritime territory. The possession of this 
territory is not optional, not dependent upon the will of the State, but compulsory. 
Id. at 160 (separate opinion by McNair, J.). 
23. Grisbadarna (Nor. v. Swed.), 11 R.I.A.A. 147, 159 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1909), reprinted 
in 4 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 226, 231 (1910). 
24. Dispute between Argentina and Chile concerning the Beagle Channel, 21 
R.I.A.A. 53, ¶ 107 (Ct. Arb. 1977) [hereinafter Beagle Channel Arbitration]. On this 
ground, Spain’s assertion of a “dry coast” doctrine, pursuant to which Gibraltar is in-
capable of generating a territorial sea, finds little support. See Jamie Trinidad, The Dis-
puted Waters around Gibraltar, 86 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 101, 
151–54 (2015). 
25. Oral Argument by Professor Andre Gros of France, Minquiers and Ecrehos 
(U.K. v. Fr.), 1953 I.C.J. Pleadings 190, 200–01 (Sept. 28, 1953). 
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further consequences.”26 In Eritrea v. Yemen, the arbitral tribunal acknowl-
edged the presumption that islands within the twelve nautical-miles coastal 
belt would belong to the coastal State, but emphasized that “it would be no 
more than a presumption, capable of being rebutted by evidence of a supe-
rior title.”27 
This thesis has also been employed in the context of other maritime 
zones. In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the principle of domination of 
the land over the sea, together with the “natural prolongation” theory that 
the continental shelf was a continuation of the land territory, was used to 
provide a geographical justification for the assertion of vested rights over 
submerged land.28 In the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, the International 
Court of Justice was even more explicit about the territorial nexus of the 
continental shelf, stating: 
 
It is solely by virtue of the coastal State’s sovereignty over the land that 
rights of exploration and exploitation in the continental shelf can attach to 
it, ipso jure, under international law. In short, continental shelf rights are 
legally both an emanation from and an automatic adjunct of the territorial 
sovereignty of the coastal State.29 
 
The same Court extended the application of this principle to the exclusive 
economic zone in the Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea judgment.30 And 
in Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras, it observed, 
“the claim relating to sovereignty [over the islands in the maritime area] is 
implicit in and arises directly out of the question . . . namely the delimitation 
                                                                                                                      
26. Minquiers and Ecrehos (U.K. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1953 I.C.J. Rep. 47, 99 (Nov. 
17). There is no reference to this argument in the judgment itself. 
27. Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute (Eri. v. Yemen), 22 R.I.A.A. 
209, 317, ¶ 474 (Arb. Trib. 1998) [hereinafter Eritrea v. Yemen]. 
28. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 14, ¶¶ 43, 96. 
29. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), Judgment, 1978 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 86 
(Dec. 19). See also Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), Judgment, 1982 I.C.J. Rep. 18, ¶ 73 
(Feb. 24) [hereinafter Tunisia v. Libya]; Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), Judgment, 1985 
I.C.J. Rep. 13, ¶ 49 (June 3) [hereinafter Libya v. Malta]; Maritime Delimitation in the Area 
between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1993 I.C.J. Rep. 38, ¶ 80 (June 
14) [hereinafter Denmark v. Norway]. 
30. Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.), Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. Rep. 
61, ¶ 77 (Feb. 3). See also Dispute concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary be-
tween Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangl. v. Myan.), Case No. 16, Judg-
ment, Mar. 14, 2012, 2012 ITLOS Rep. 4, ¶ 185 (referring to the principle in relation to the 
delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf). 
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of the disputed areas of the territorial sea, continental shelf and exclusive 
economic zone.”31 Referring to these applications of the principle, China de-
veloped the argument in the South China Sea arbitration (while being absent 
from the arbitral proceedings) that “only after the extent of China’s territorial 
sovereignty in the South China Sea is determined can a decision be made on 
whether China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea have exceeded the 
extent allowed under the [Law of the Sea] Convention.”32 
The second thesis that derives from the principle of domination of the 
land over the sea concerns the role of geographical considerations in deter-
mining the extent of maritime zones. This aspect of the principle is integral 
to the requirement that baselines, from which all the different maritime 
zones are to be generated, do “not depart to any appreciable extent from the 
general direction of the coast.”33 In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the 
International Court of Justice emphasized the need to consider geographical 
configurations, drawing on the principle of domination of the land over the 
sea, which furnished a means to decipher the unique legal characteristics of 
the geologically oriented regime, as well as a geographical justification for the 
assertion of vested rights over submerged land.34 This is not to say that the 
mere physical fact of adjacency to the sea would produce a legal entitlement 
to maritime zones, but rather, it emphasizes the role that geographical con-
ditions play as “medium,” by operation of the law, to confer upon the coastal 
State a legal entitlement to a maritime zone adjacent to its coasts.35 
The reference to the principle of domination of the land over the sea in 
subsequent cases has not been due so much to the legal attribution of mari-
time zones as to the primacy of geographical conditions in the determination 
and delimitation of maritime rights. In Tunisia v. Libya, while recalling that 
                                                                                                                      
31. Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Car-
ibbean Sea (Nicar. v. Hond.), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 659, ¶ 114 (Oct. 8) [hereinafter 
Nicaragua v. Honduras]. 
32. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, Position Paper of the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the 
Republic of the Philippines, 15 CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 431, 434 (2016) 
(noting paragraph ten specifically). 
33. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 7(3); Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone art. 4(2), Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. 
34. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 14, ¶ 96. 
35. Libya v. Malta, supra note 29, at 83, ¶ 21 (separate opinion by Ruda, J., Bedjaoui, 
J., and Jiménez de Aréchaga, J.); see also Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the 
Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. Rep. 246, ¶ 103 (Oct. 12) 
[hereinafter Canada v. U.S.]. 
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the “geographical correlation between coast and submerged areas off the 
coast is the basis of the coastal State’s legal title,”36 the Court treated the 
coast of each party as nothing more than “the starting line from which one 
has to set out in order to ascertain how far the submarine areas appertaining 
to each of them extend in a seaward direction, as well as in relation to neigh-
boring States situated either in an adjacent or opposite position.”37 Similarly, 
in Qatar v. Bahrain, the principle of domination of the land over the sea was 
referred to by way of emphasizing that it is “the terrestrial territorial situation 
that must be taken as starting point for the determination of the maritime 
rights of a coastal State,”38 according to which the Court was to determine 
which maritime features constituted part of Bahrain’s relevant coasts and 
baselines.39 The same approach was adopted more recently in Nicaragua v. 
Colombia.40 
Thus, the emphasis in the role of the principle of domination of the land 
over the sea appears to have shifted from the geographical justification for 
the extension of sovereign authority during the formative stage of the legal 
regime of maritime zones, to the centrality of geographical conditions to the 
determination and delimitation of maritime rights as the law of the sea re-
gime has developed and been consolidated. The shift has been evident in 
two recent arbitrations established under Annex VII of the Law of the Sea 
Convention concerning jurisdictional questions that arose from mixed dis-
putes involving both territorial title and maritime claims. In the Chagos Marine 
Protected Area arbitration,41 one of the jurisdictional questions posed to the 
arbitral tribunal was whether the dispute—in this case, whether the United 
Kingdom was entitled to declare a marine protected area or other maritime 
zones since it was not a coastal State within the meaning of, inter alia, Articles 
2, 55, 56, and 76 of the Law of the Sea Convention—was excluded from its 
jurisdiction, which was restricted to “any dispute concerning the interpreta-
tion or application of this Convention.”42 Departing from the first thesis of 
the principle of domination of the land over the sea, the tribunal addressed 
                                                                                                                      
36. Tunisia v. Libya, supra note 29, ¶ 73. 
37. Id. ¶ 74. 
38. Qatar v. Bahrain, supra note 1, ¶ 185. 
39. Id. ¶ 186. 
40. Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 
624, ¶¶ 140–41 (Nov. 19) [hereinafter Nicaragua v. Colombia]. 
41. In the Matter of the Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. U.K.), 
PCA Case No. 2011-03, Award (Arb. Trib. under LOSC Annex VII 2015), https://files.pca-
cpa.org/pcadocs/MU-UK%2020150318%20Award.pdf. 
42. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 288(1). 
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the question as one that required it to “evaluate where the relative weight of 
the dispute lies.”43 In the words of the tribunal: 
 
Is the Parties’ dispute primarily a matter of the interpretation and applica-
tion of the term “coastal State”, with the issue of sovereignty forming one 
aspect of a larger question? Or does the Parties’ dispute primarily concern 
sovereignty, with the United Kingdom’s actions as a “coastal State” merely 
representing a manifestation of that dispute?44 
 
The majority considered that the dispute was “properly characterized as re-
lating to land sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago,”45 whereas Judges 
Kateka and Wolfrum dissented as they saw the submission of Mauritius as 
appropriately qualified with reference to the term “coastal State” at its core.46 
This majority view of the Chagos tribunal is distinguished in the South China 
Sea arbitration, in which the arbitral tribunal applied a two-pronged test to 
the jurisdictional question posed by a mixed dispute: (a) whether an explicit 
or implicit determination of sovereignty is a prerequisite for the resolution 
of the maritime claims; and (b) whether the actual objective of a State Party’s 
maritime claims is to advance its position in the dispute over sovereignty.47 
As neither of these criteria was satisfied, the tribunal held that “the determi-
nation of the nature of and entitlements generated by the maritime features 
in the South China Sea does not require a decision on issues of territorial 
sovereignty.”48 Although the decision makes no reference to the principle of 
domination of the land over the sea, its position is consistent with the second 
thesis of the principle advanced by the Philippines, which emphasized the 
relevance of geographical considerations by stating, “without land, there can 
be no maritime entitlements on the basis of historic rights or otherwise.”49  
This shift in emphasis has diminished the normative value of the principle 
of domination of the land over the sea for the legal attribution of maritime 
                                                                                                                      
43. Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration, supra note 41, ¶ 211. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. ¶ 212. 
46. In the Matter of the Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. 
U.K.), PCA Case No. 2011-03, Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, ¶¶ 8–17 (Arb. 
Trib. under LOSC Annex VII 2015) (separate opinion by Kateka, J. and Wolfrum, J.), 
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1570. 
47. In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), PCA Case 
No. 2013-19, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 153 (Arb. Trib. under LOSC 
Annex VII 2015), https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1506. 
48. Id. ¶ 180. 
49. Id. ¶ 143. 
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zones to such an extent that its application to maritime claims in disputed 
waters, and its impact upon navigational rights, has become more uncertain. 
As a result, in cases where the basis (or the extent) of a sovereign claim to a 
territorial sea is challenged, the principle provides two possible legal argu-
ments: (a) the disputed claim is not opposable to the challenging State, there-
fore the challenging State’s vessels may exercise freedom of navigation and 
overflight in disputed waters; or (b) the disputed claim is a purported exercise 
of sovereignty, therefore the challenging State’s vessels can only exercise the 
right of innocent passage in disputed waters. Each of these arguments war-
rants closer examination by assessing them in the different legal contexts in 
which the applicability of the regime of innocent passage may be challenged, 
before turning to the legal effect of the regime in disputed waters. 
 
III. APPLICABILITY OF THE REGIME OF INNOCENT PASSAGE IN                
DISPUTED WATERS 
 
The regime of innocent passage consists of a navigational right of passage 
by foreign-flagged vessels and the corresponding restriction on, or a qualifi-
cation of, the coastal State’s sovereignty in its territorial sea.50 The juridical 
nature of the right of innocent passage and its scope has thus corresponded 
to the juridical nature of the territorial sea as it evolved.51 As such, innocent 
passage is a distinct legal regime governing one of the modes of navigation 
for foreign-flagged vessels, along with transit passage in international straits, 
archipelagic sea lanes passage, and freedom of navigation and overflight on 
the high seas. Its applicability is limited to the territorial waters of coastal 
                                                                                                                      
50. Compañia de Navegación Nacional (Panama) v. United States, 6 R.I.A.A. 382, 384 
(Gen. Claims Comm’n 1933); John E. Noyes, The Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 3, at 97; Peter B. Walker, What 
Is Innocent Passage? 61 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 365, 368 (1980). 
51. For different theories on the juridical nature of the territorial sea prior to its con-
temporary codification, see, for example, R. R. CHURCHILL & A. V. LOWE, THE LAW OF 
THE SEA 71–75 (3d ed. 1999); René-Jean Dupuy, The Sea under National Competence, in A 
HANDBOOK ON THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA 247, 254–57 (René-Jean Dupuy & Daniel 
Vignes eds., 1991); D.P. O’Connell, The Juridical Nature of the Territorial Sea, 45 BRITISH YEAR-
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (1971); PHILLIP C. JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL 
WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTIONS (1927); Percy Thomas Fenn, Jr., Origins of the Theory 
of Territorial Waters, 20 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 465 (1926); THOMAS 
WEMYSS FULTON, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA 338–77 (1911). 
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States,52 and is therefore dependent upon the validity of the coastal State’s 
maritime claim to a territorial sea and its geographical reach.  
In disputed waters where the regime of innocent passage purportedly 
applies, the context of the dispute has a bearing upon the legal effect of a 
unilateral act to challenge the applicability of the regime. To that end, this 
Part examines three different legal contexts in which the applicability of the 
regime may be disputed: (a) where sovereignty over coastal land is contested; 
(b) where the legal classification of a maritime feature is in dispute; and (c) 
where the outer reach of a territorial sea is considered excessive. In each of 
these contexts, doctrinal uncertainty as to the applicability of the regime of 
innocent passage is entangled with the legal significance, or a lack thereof, 
that the passage of foreign-flagged vessels carries as an act of protest. 
 
A. The Dispute over Territorial Title 
 
When sovereignty over coastal land is contested, the legal basis for claiming 
a twelve nautical miles maritime zone adjacent thereto as a territorial sea itself 
is in dispute. The attribution of the territorial sea, when two or more States 
contest sovereignty over coastal land, is essentially a territorial dispute, which 
requires resolution according to the rules concerning territorial title under 
international law or ex aequo et bono should the disputing parties agree to it.53 
Indeed, the International Court of Justice has observed, “the attribution of 
maritime areas to the territory of a State, which, by its nature, is destined to 
be permanent, is a legal process based solely on the possession by the terri-
tory concerned of a coastline.”54 It follows that the territorial sea adjacent to 
contested coastal land cannot be attributed to any particular State until and 
unless the territorial dispute is resolved.55 This leaves the legal status of the 
adjacent maritime area, and applicability of the regime of innocent passage, 
open to question and challenge by other States. 
                                                                                                                      
52. An exception to this is that the right of innocent passage continues to apply in areas 
of internal water that had not been considered as such prior to the establishment of a straight 
baseline. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 8(2). In addition, the regime of innocent passage applies 
in archipelagic waters outside designated archipelagic sea lanes of an archipelagic State. Id. 
art. 52. 
53. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(2), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. 
54. Denmark v. Norway, supra note 29, ¶ 80. 
55. For a list of islands with disputed territorial claims, see VICTOR PRESCOTT & 
CLIVE SCHOFIELD, THE MARITIME POLITICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE WORLD tbl. 11.1 
(2d ed. 2005). 
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One view holds that if the principle of domination of the land over the 
sea is applied according to its first thesis, effective control over the contested 
coastal land is insufficient in itself to generate legal entitlement to the adja-
cent maritime area, which therefore remains open to freedom of navigation 
by any State. James Kraska, for example, observes in the context of the South 
China Sea dispute: “Since the territorial sea is [a] function of state sovereignty 
of each rock or island, and not a function of simple geography, if the United 
States does not recognize any State having title to the feature, then it is not 
obligated to observe a theoretical territorial sea and may treat the feature as 
terra nullius.”56 However, the opposing view is that the effective control exer-
cised by one of the disputing States over the contested coastal land and the 
adjacent maritime area is an exercise of sovereignty, which remains valid until 
and unless the legitimate title is found in the other State.57 This view is prem-
ised on the legal position that the classification of maritime features and en-
titlements generated by the land territory can be determined under the law 
of the sea without requiring a decision on issues of territorial sovereignty. 
The rationales for each of these views are further clarified when they are 
assessed according to the position in which each of the parties to the dispute 
finds themselves. In cases where a State claims sovereignty based on effec-
tive occupation (historic title) or acquisitive prescription (prescriptive title), 
international law jurisprudence on territorial title requires the State to 
demonstrate a continuous and peaceful display of sovereign authority (effec-
tivités) over the contested coastal land and adjacent waters.58 This requirement 
                                                                                                                      
56. James Kraska, The Legal Rationale for Going Inside 12, ASIA MARITIME TRANSPAR-
ENCY INITIATIVE (Sept. 11, 2015), https://amti.csis.org/the-legal-rationale-for-going-in-
side-12/. 
57. Australia, for example, has established maritime zones off the coast of the Austral-
ian Antarctic Territory. Attorney-General (Cth), Outline of Submissions as Amicus Curiae, 
Submission in Humane Society International Inc. v. Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd., NSD1519/2004, 
Jan. 25, 2005 [10], [18], reprinted in ANTARCTICA IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 919–20 (Ben Saul 
& Tim Stephens eds., 2015). In the context of the UN transitional administration in East 
Timor, McLaughlin observes that “UN control over a Territorial Sea is essentially sovereign 
in effect.” ROB MCLAUGHLIN, UNITED NATIONS NAVAL PEACE OPERATIONS IN THE TER-
RITORIAL SEA 167 (2009). 
58. Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge 
(Malay. v. Sing.), Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. Rep. 12, ¶¶ 62–69 (May 23) [hereinafter Sovereignty 
over Pedra Branca]; Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 554, 
¶ 63 (Dec. 22) [hereinafter Burkina Faso v. Mali] (holding that “[i]n the event that the effec-
tivités does not co-exist with any legal title, it must invariably be taken into consideration”); 
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 
53, at 45–46 (Sept. 5); Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 846 (Arb. Trib. 1928); 
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derives from the operation of the principle of intertemporal law, which de-
mands that the right be created in accordance with the law at the time the 
right arises and that the right be maintained according to the law as it subse-
quently evolves.59 On that basis, the adjudication of territorial disputes has 
tended to involve assessment of the conduct of the disputing parties per-
formed à titre de souverain (as a function of State authority). Such conduct 
includes, but is not limited to, legislative acts, administrative control, law en-
forcement, immigration control, naval patrols, and search and rescue opera-
tions occurring prior to the critical date the dispute crystallized.60 These pro-
vide evidence of a peaceful and continued display of effectivités in establishing 
a historic or prescriptive title.61 
                                                                                                                      
El Salvador v. Nicaragua, Opinion and Decision of Mar. 9, 1917 (Cent. Am. Court of 
Justice), reprinted in 11 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 674, 700–01 
(1917). 
59. The Swiss jurist Max Huber in the Island of Palmas arbitration famously articulated 
the principle of intertemporal law: 
As regards the question which of different legal systems prevailing at successive periods is 
to be applied in a particular case (the so-called intertemporal law), a distinction must be 
made between the creation of rights and the existence of rights. The same principle which 
subjects the act creative of a right to the law in force at the time the right arises, demands 
that the existence of the right, in other words its continued manifestation, shall follow the 
conditions required by the evolution of law.  
Island of Palmas, supra note 58, at 845. 
For further discussion of this principle, see Hitoshi Nasu & Donald R. Rothwell, Re-
Evaluating the Role of International Law in Territorial and Maritime Disputes in East Asia, 4 ASIAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 55, 61–67 (2014). See also Ulf Linderfalk, The Application 
of International Legal Norms over Time: The Second Branch of Intertemporal Law, 58 NETHERLANDS 
INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 147 (2011); JOSHUA CASTELLINO & STEVE ALLEN, TITLE 
TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TEMPORARY ANALYSIS (2003); T.O. Elias, The 
Doctrine of Intertemporal Law, 74 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 285 (1980); 
ROBERT Y. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 28–31 
(1963); 1 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL LAW AS 
APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 21–24 (3d ed. 1957). 
60. On the notion of the critical date, see, for example, L.F.E. Goldie, The Critical Date, 
12 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 1251 (1963); Gerald Fitz-
maurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951–4: Points of Substan-
tive Law Part II, 32 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 20, 20–44 (1955–56). 
61. Nicaragua v. Colombia, supra note 40, ¶¶ 66–84; Sovereignty over Pedra Branca, 
supra note 58, ¶¶ 231–77; Nicaragua v. Honduras, supra note 31, ¶¶ 176–208; Frontier 
Dispute (Benin v. Niger), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 90, ¶¶ 82–100 (July 12) [hereinafter 
Benin v. Niger]; Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.), 
Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 625, ¶¶ 137–49 (Dec. 17); Qatar v. Bahrain, supra note 1, ¶ 
197; Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 1045, ¶¶ 96–
99 (Dec. 13) [hereinafter Botswana v. Namibia]; Land, Island and Maritime Frontier 
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This is also the case where national borders have not been established 
with geographical precision until a territorial dispute erupts. As observed in 
the Island of Palmas arbitration: 
 
If . . . no conventional line of sufficient topographical precision exists or if 
there are gaps in the frontiers otherwise established, or if a conventional 
line leaves room for doubt, or if, as e.g., in the case of an island situated in 
the high seas, the question arises whether a title is valid erga omnes, the actual 
continuous and peaceful display of State functions is in case of dispute the 
sound and natural criterion of territorial sovereignty.62  
 
The International Court of Justice applied this approach in Burkina Faso v. 
Mali, holding that in cases “where the legal title is not capable of showing 
exactly the territorial expanse to which it relates . . . effectivités can then play 
an essential role in showing how the title is interpreted in practice.”63 Thus, 
from the perspective of States exercising effective control over contested 
coastal land and the adjacent waters, there are strong policy reasons for ap-
plying and enforcing the regime of innocent passage as evidence of effectivités. 
Similarly, when a State contests sovereignty over coastal land and adja-
cent waters under control of another State, there are also good reasons for 
the former to challenge the exercise of sovereign authority by the latter. As 
the Permanent Court of International Justice observed in Legal Status of East-
ern Greenland, “another circumstance which must be taken into account by 
any tribunal which has to adjudicate upon a claim to sovereignty over a par-
ticular territory, is the extent to which sovereignty is also claimed by some 
other Power.”64 Indeed, absence of protest by one of the disputing parties 
has been of critical significance in many of the territorial disputes settled by 
international courts and tribunals.65 
                                                                                                                      
Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond., Nicar. intervening), Judgment, 1992 I.C.J. Rep. 351, ¶¶ 356–
67 (Sept. 11) [hereinafter El Salvador v. Honduras]; Minquiers and Ecrehos, supra note 
26, at 60–72. 
62. Island of Palmas, supra note 58, at 840. 
63. Burkina Faso v. Mali, supra note 58, ¶ 63.  
64. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, supra note 58, at 46. See also Fitzmaurice, 
supra note 60, at 64–66. 
65. See, e.g., Nicaragua v. Colombia, supra note 40, ¶ 84; Sovereignty over Pedra 
Branca, supra note 58, ¶¶ 274–76; Benin v. Niger, supra note 61, at ¶ 98; Sovereignty 
over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, supra note 61, ¶ 148; El Salvador v. Honduras, 
supra note 61, ¶ 368; Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), Judgment, 1962 
I.C.J. Rep. 6, 31 (June 15). 
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The failure to protest may generate different legal effects for the State 
concerned in establishing evidence of the existence or non-existence of a 
title.66 Most relevantly, it may amount to acquiescence when it is a prerequi-
site for the valid formation of territorial title.67 Acquiescence in the context 
of territorial disputes is “equivalent to tacit recognition manifested by unilat-
eral conduct which the other party may interpret as consent,”68 and thus 
forms a constituent element of a historic or prescriptive title in demonstrat-
ing effectivités.69 It follows that an effective protest operates as evidence to 
rebut the presumption of acquiescence in the formation of a prescriptive or 
historic title, although it does not nullify the competing claim of sovereignty. 
By contrast, when the acquisition or attribution of territory is based on a 
bilateral agreement, the territorial dispute is to be settled by recourse to treaty 
interpretation in the interest of stability and finality.70 Yet, even in such cases, 
the establishment of a change in treaty-based title effected by acquiescence 
is not wholly precluded as a possibility in law.71 
It should be emphasized that no protest would invalidate territorial title 
acquired by another State through peaceful occupation when the territory 
concerned was clearly terra nullius, for effective protest “must be directed 
against the violation of a right which is vested in the protesting State.”72 In 
practice, however, territorial disputes tend to arise when there is room for 
                                                                                                                      
66. Gerald Fitzmaurice identified four different legal effects: (i) a tacit abandonment of 
its own title; (ii) a failure to check the prescriptive acquisition of a title by another State; (iii) 
acquiescence in, or an admission of the validity of, the claim of the other party to the dispute; 
and (iv) an admission (or evidence) of the non-existence of the title of the non-protesting 
party. Fitzmaurice, supra note 60, at 59–60.  
67. For a detailed discussion, see I.C. MacGibbon, The Scope of Acquiescence in International 
Law, 31 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 143, 152–67 (1954); I.C. Mac-
Gibbon, Some Observations on the Part of Protest in International Law, 30 BRITISH YEARBOOK 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 293, 306–07 (1953). 
68. Canada v. U.S., supra note 35, ¶ 130. 
69. See, e.g., YAHUDA Z. BLUM, HISTORIC TITLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 38–98 
(1965); JENNINGS, supra note 59, at 39–40. 
70. See Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. Rep. 6, ¶¶ 72–73 
(Feb. 3) [hereinafter Libya v. Chad]; Temple of Preah Vihear, supra note 65, at 34. Cf. 
Botswana v. Namibia, supra note 61, at 1146–48, ¶¶14–20 (separate opinion by 
Kooijmans, J.). 
71. Decision regarding Delimitation of the Border between Eritrea and Ethiopia, 
25 R.I.A.A. 83, ¶¶ 3.14–3.15 (Boundary Comm’n 2002); El Salvador v. Honduras, supra 
note 61, ¶ 80; Beagle Channel Arbitration, supra note 24, ¶¶ 164–72. See also Roger 
O’Keefe, Legal Title versus Effectivités: Prescription and the Promise and Problems of Private 
Law Analogies, 13 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY LAW REVIEW 147, 154–82 (2011).  
72. MacGibbon, The Scope of Acquiescence in International Law, supra note 67, at 167. 
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debate as to which State first satisfied the requirement for peaceful occupa-
tion.73 Absence of protest in those instances provides evidence of acquies-
cence when opposition is called for in the face of a competing State’s open 
and official acts of sovereignty in the establishment of a title. Such circum-
stances arise when (1) the competing claim of sovereignty is made open and 
public;74 (2) the original title holder has actual or presumptive knowledge of 
the competing claim of sovereignty;75 and (3) the original title holder has the 
ability and opportunity to protest within a reasonable time after it learns that 
the competing claim of sovereignty may be prejudicial to its rights.76 
Competing sovereignty claims also create difficult problems for third 
States that must decide the mode of navigation their vessels will take in the 
territorial sea adjacent to contested coastal land, particularly if they adopt a 
neutral position toward the territorial dispute. Restricting the navigation of 
their vessels to innocent passage could be seen as assisting the occupying 
State in reinforcing its continuous and peaceful display of sovereign author-
ity. Asserting high seas freedom of navigation rights, by contrast, will conflict 
with the occupying State’s claim of sovereignty over the disputed territory. 
There is a fine line between not recognizing a territorial sea by claiming that 
no State has established title to the territory, and not recognizing a territorial 
sea by rejecting the occupying State’s sovereignty claim.77 As will be dis-
cussed below, these positions can be expressed in the different ways in which 
                                                                                                                      
73. MALCOLM SHAW, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN AFRICA: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ISSUES 17 (1986). 
74. See, e.g., Nicaragua v. Colombia, supra note 40, ¶ 84; Beagle Channel Arbitration, 
supra note 24, ¶ 172. 
75. See, e.g., Delimitation of the Border between Eritrea and Ethiopia, supra note 
71, ¶ 3.9; Fisheries, supra note 20, at 138–39; Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure 
of the International Court of Justice, 1951–54: General Principles and Sources of Law, 30 BRITISH 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 33–42 (1953). 
76. See, e.g., Dubai-Sharjah Border Arbitration, 91 I.L.R. 543, 624 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
1981); Canada v. U.S., supra note 35, ¶¶ 132, 140; EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW 
OF NATIONS bk. 2, ch. 11, ¶ 144 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Institute of 
Washington 1916) (1758) (denying acquiescence when there are just reasons for silence 
such as the impossibility of speaking and “a well-founded fear”). With regard to the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, for example, Japan asserts that it completed peaceful occupation 
of the islands in 1894 since these were terra nullius at that time. One of the key questions for 
this dispute is therefore how effectively China can prove the lack of knowledge of an official 
act of occupation by the Japanese government or its inability to make an effective protest 
out of “a well-founded fear.” 
77. Adam Klein & Mira Rapp-Hooper, Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China 
Sea: What to Watch For, LAWFARE (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/ freedom-
navigation-operations-south-china-sea-what-watch.  
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foreign-flagged vessels may engage in what a coastal State may consider non-
innocent passage. 
 
B. The Dispute over the Legal Classification of Maritime Features 
 
Uncertainty as to the applicability of the regime of innocent passage also 
arises when there is disagreement over whether a particular maritime feature 
can be classified as an island (including a rock) within the meaning of Article 
121 of the Law of the Sea Convention. The entitlement of a maritime feature 
to the territorial sea is a purely factual determination. Namely, if a naturally 
formed area of land remains above water at high tide it is an island and is 
capable of generating a territorial sea,78 whereas if it is submerged at high tide 
it is a low-tide elevation and is incapable of generating a territorial sea of its 
own.79 However, there are various technical challenges in defining tidal levels 
without detailed hydrographic surveys conducted over a significant period. 
Disagreement may arise from the use of different measurements of high wa-
ter, different tidal data sets, and the spatial and temporal variations of tidal 
patterns.80 Land reclamation activities carried out on maritime features fur-
ther compound the objective assessment of the naturally formed condition 
of the features.81 
Insofar as disagreement on the factual determination involves an inter-
pretation of treaty terms such as “high tide” and “above water,” the applica-
bility of the regime of innocent passage is dependent on how these terms are 
interpreted and applied in assessing the entitlement of a maritime feature to 
a territorial sea. However, when a State’s proclamation of a territorial sea 
surrounding a maritime feature has not been disputed for a period of time, 
the applicability of the regime of innocent passage may also be dependent 
upon whether the law of the sea regime allows for the residual formation of 
customary international law on a sovereign entitlement attached to maritime 
features of disputable classification. This entitlement does not derive from, 
                                                                                                                      
78. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 121. 
79. Except where it falls within the breadth of a territorial sea generated from a high 
tide feature or the mainland. Id. art. 13(2). 
80. Note the technical challenges that confronted the arbitral tribunal in the South 
China Sea arbitration. See In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. 
China), PCA Case No. 2013-19, Award, ¶¶ 310–32 (Arb. Trib. under LOSC Annex VII 
2016) [hereinafter South China Sea Arbitration Award]. See also Nicaragua v. Colombia, 
supra note 40, ¶¶ 28–38. 
81. Note that no human modification can change the naturally formed status of 
the maritime features. South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 80, ¶¶ 305–06.  
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and therefore must be distinguished from, any historic rights that a State may 
have enjoyed previously since those have been superseded by the limits of 
the maritime zones provided by the Law of the Sea Convention82 or by the 
customary international law of the sea.83 It rather forms part of general in-
ternational law,84 primarily the law governing territorial sovereignty as it in-
tersects with the law of the sea regime. 
Even though the issue here does not concern acquisition or attribution 
of territorial title itself,85 the proclamation of a territorial sea surrounding a 
maritime feature is analogous to acquisitive prescription. In both situations 
legal validity may be given to titles and associated maritime entitlements that 
were either originally invalid (in this instance the feature may be incapable of 
appropriation or generating maritime zones) or whose original validity is im-
possible to prove due to the lack of sufficient scientific evidence that estab-
lishes the geographical condition of the feature in its natural form.86 It is 
debatable whether the assertion of sovereign authority over a maritime fea-
ture of disputable classification and the proclamation of a territorial sea ad-
jacent thereto, much like a prescriptive or historic title, will generate a legally 
valid claim when the State has demonstrated its intention and will to act as a 
sovereign with an actual exercise or display of such authority in a peaceful 
and uninterrupted manner for a certain length of time. 
                                                                                                                      
82. Id. ¶¶ 235–62. 
83. Canada v. U.S., supra note 35, ¶ 235. 
84. The preamble to the LOSC affirms, “matters not regulated by this Convention 
continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law.” 
LOSC, supra note 2, pmbl. 
85. It should be noted, however, that there are different views as to whether low-
tide elevations are capable of appropriation by sovereignty. Compare Eritrea v. Yemen, 
supra note 27, ¶¶ 475, 508 (including low-tide elevations in the award for territorial 
sovereignty), with South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 80, ¶ 309 (denying 
sovereignty over low-tide elevations). See also Qatar v. Bahrain, supra note 1, ¶¶ 205–06. 
86. See D.H.N. Johnson, Acquisitive Prescription in International Law, 27 BRITISH YEAR-
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 332, 332 (1950). In this respect, theoretical support is 
found in the concept of historical consolidation espoused by de Visscher. CHARLES DE 
VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 200–01 (P.E. Corbett 
trans., 1957). For criticism of this concept, see JENNINGS, supra note 59, at 25–26; D.H.N. 
Johnson, Consolidation as a Root of Title in International Law, 13 CAMBRIDGE LAW JOURNAL 
215, 223 (1955). 
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The absence of protest is likely to carry considerable, if not conclusive, 
probative value as a constituent element of prescription or estoppel as a gen-
eral principle of law.87 In turn, this absence of protest may prevent States 
from challenging the validity of the legal claim made on the maritime feature 
and adjacent maritime area. For example, Hersch Lauterpacht considered the 
absence of protest especially relevant to the extension of sovereign rights 
over submarine areas under customary international law and explained its 
significance as follows: 
 
It is an essential requirement of stability – a requirement even more im-
portant in the international than in other spheres; it is a precept of fair 
dealing inasmuch as it prevents states from playing fast and loose with sit-
uations affecting others; and it is in accordance with equity inasmuch as it 
protects a state from the contingency of incurring responsibilities and ex-
pense, in reliance on the apparent acquiescence of others, and being sub-
sequently confronted with a challenge on the part of those very States.88 
 
He continues, finding the relevance of the failure to protest especially con-
spicuous in the international sphere because “the normal avenues for ascer-
taining disputed rights through the compulsory jurisdiction of tribunals are 
not always available.”89  
Alternatively, the doctrine of acquiescence may operate as an evidentiary 
element in the interpretation of a treaty provision by showing general agree-
ment in the subsequent practice of States in the sense of Article 31(3)(b) of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.90 In its effort to clarify the 
                                                                                                                      
87. See Temple of Preah Vihear, supra note 65, at 39–43 (separate opinion by Alfaro, J.), 
id. at 62–65 (separate opinion by Fitzmaurice, J.). See also JENNINGS, supra note 59, at 41–51; 
I.C. MacGibbon, Estoppel in International Law, 7 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 
QUARTERLY 468 (1958); D.W. Bowett, Estoppel Before International Tribunals and Its Relation to 
Acquiescence, 33 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 176 (1957); BIN CHENG, 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 
141–49 (1953). 
88. Hersch Lauterpacht, Sovereignty over Submarine Areas, 27 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 376, 396 (1950). 
89. Id. 
90. See, e.g., South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 80, ¶¶ 274–75; Appel-
late Body Report, European Communities – Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken 
Cuts, ¶ 272, WTO Doc. WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R (adopted Sept. 12, 
2005); Beagle Channel Arbitration, supra note 24, ¶ 169. See also Georg Nolte (Special 
Rapporteur), Second Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the 
Interpretation of Treaties, ¶¶ 20–33, 58–70, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/671 (Mar. 26, 2014); Oli-
ver Dörr, Article 31: General Rule of Interpretation, in VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW 
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meaning of this interpretive rule, the International Law Commission has sug-
gested that in order to establish general agreement under Article 31(3)(b), 
“[s]ilence on the part of one or more parties can constitute acceptance of the 
subsequent practice when the circumstances call for some reaction.”91 In the 
context of the Law of the Sea Convention, the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea observed in the M/V “Virginia G” judgment that coastal 
State regulation of bunkering of foreign vessels fishing in its exclusive eco-
nomic zone is established State practice that developed after the adoption of 
the Convention. It cited the national legislation of several States and noted, 
“there is no manifest objection to such legislation and that it is, in general, 
complied with.”92 It is thus arguable that when a particular interpretation of 
the terms of a treaty is clearly asserted, the failure to protest may amount to 
“general agreement” between the parties as a whole.93 Yet, it is debatable 
whether the mere practice of the declaration of a territorial sea adjacent to a 
maritime feature of disputable classification can be considered as a particular 
interpretation of the terms of the Law of the Sea Convention, or rather a 
breach thereof.94 
States are under no obligation to protest an assertion of sovereign au-
thority over a maritime feature and adjacent maritime area by another State. 
However, for contesting territorial title, protest is considered necessary to 
preserve the rights of the protesting State in circumstances where failure to 
protest would be tantamount to acquiescence as a constituent element of 
perfecting a historic or prescriptive title.95 In the maritime context, the valid-
ity of any unilateral act of delimiting the sea depends upon international law, 
                                                                                                                      
OF TREATIES – A COMMENTARY 559, 602 (Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach eds., 
2d ed. 2018); M.E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON 
THE LAW OF TREATIES 431–32 (2009).  
91. International Law Commission, Report on the Work of Its Sixty-Sixth Session, 
GAOR, 69th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/69/10, Conclusion 9, ¶ 2, at 197 (2014). 
92. M/V “Virginia G” (Pan. v. Guinea-Bissau), Case No. 19, Judgment of Apr. 14, 
2014 ITLOS Rep. 4, 69, ¶¶ 217–18. 
93. Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 
169, 222, ¶ 15, A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l (The Commission considered that “the 
phrase ‘the understanding of the parties’ necessarily means ‘the parties as a whole.’”). 
94. In the context of a bilateral boundary treaty, there are at least two criteria that would 
have to be satisfied to that end: (1) a subjective belief on the part of the occupying power 
that the practice is consistent with the treaty terms; and (2) the other side is fully aware of 
and accepted that practice as a confirmation of the treaty terms. See Botswana v. Namibia, 
supra note 61, ¶ 74; Beagle Channel Arbitration, supra note 24, ¶ 169.  
95. See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text. 
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rather than an effective exercise of sovereignty.96 This means that protest 
may create a legal barrier only if, by virtue of the residual development of 
customary international law, acquiescence forms a constituent element of 
perfecting the sovereign entitlement to a maritime feature of disputable clas-
sification and the adjacent maritime area. The applicability of the regime of 
innocent passage, based on the purported exercise of sovereign authority 
over a maritime feature of disputable classification, must therefore be ascer-
tained by the extent to which acquiescence operates to rebut the presump-
tion of the freedom of the seas. 
An implication of these possible legal grounds for asserting sovereignty 
over a maritime feature of disputable classification is that an unchallenged 
claim to the territorial sea adjacent to a maritime feature may be deemed 
valid, after a reasonable length of time, if it is subsequently disputed. This 
remains the case even when a third-party adjudicatory body, upon the devel-
opment of a dispute, establishes that the feature is a low-tide elevation and 
therefore incapable of generating a territorial sea under the Law of the Sea 
Convention. This implication sets the validity of the maritime claim apart 
from the principle of domination of the land over the sea and the principle’s 
centrality of geographical conditions to the determination and delimitation 
of maritime rights. Instead, it shifts the emphasis of the principle back to the 
first thesis of the principle as a geographical justification for the extension 
of sovereign authority over a maritime feature when its legal classification is 
uncertain or disputable. 
Another implication is that maritime States failing to challenge the asser-
tion and exercise of sovereign authority when there is a factual and objective 
basis for disputing the legal classification of the maritime feature as an island 
will be considered as contributing to, and being bound by, the residual rule 
of customary international law, or a particular interpretation of treaty terms. 
This results because while the acquisition of territorial title by a State is con-
tested vis-à-vis another claimant State, the proclamation of a territorial sea is 
an exercise of sovereign authority over the maritime area vis-à-vis the entire 
community of States, at the expense of freedom of the seas in an area that 
would otherwise remain open to them.97 Insofar as the customary interna-
tional law basis is concerned, the doctrine of persistent objector could be 
invoked to preclude the contesting State, through repeated and consistent 
objections, from being bound by the residual rule of customary international 
                                                                                                                      
96. Fisheries, supra note 20, at 132. 
97. JENNINGS, supra note 59, at 39–40; Johnson, Acquisitive Prescription in Interna-
tional Law, supra note 86, at 350–51. 
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law.98 Every maritime State is thus incentivized to ensure that their vessels 
navigating through the maritime area will not be seen as acquiescing to the 
residual formation of customary international law.99 Critical in this respect, 
as will be discussed below, is the mode of navigation that would be consid-
ered as sufficient evidence of persistent objection when the regime of inno-
cent passage is purportedly applied in an area claimed as a territorial sea gen-
erated by a maritime feature of disputable classification.  
 
C. The Dispute over the Outer Limit of the Territorial Sea 
 
The legal regime of the territorial sea, as established under the Law of the 
Sea Convention, is considered reflective of customary international law.100 
Therefore, unlike disputes over title to land and the legal classification of 
maritime features, any disagreement regarding the geographical limit of the 
territorial sea concerns an interpretation and application of the terms of the 
Convention. It is for each coastal State to establish the breadth of its territo-
rial sea up to a limit not exceeding twelve nautical miles,101 but a dispute may 
arise as to whether the baseline for establishing the breadth of the territorial 
sea has been determined in accordance with the Convention.102 Of particular 
                                                                                                                      
98. See especially JAMES A. GREEN, THE PERSISTENT OBJECTOR RULE IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (2016). 
99. Of particular note is the announcement made by the governments of the 
United Kingdom and France that British and French naval vessels will participate in 
freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, though their precise legal 
concerns and legal motives for their decision are unclear. See, e.g., France, UK Announce 
South China Sea Freedom of Navigation Operations, NAVAL TODAY (June 6, 2018), 
https://navaltoday.com/2018/06/06/france-uk-announce-south-china-sea-freedom-
of-navigation-operations/; Bill Hayton, Britain Is Right to Stand Up to China Over Freedom 
of Navigation, CHATHAM HOUSE (June 1, 2018), https://www.chathamhouse.org/ex-
pert/comment/britain-right-stand-china-over-freedom-navigation; Yo-Jung Chen, South 
China Sea: The French Are Coming, THE DIPLOMAT (July 14, 2016), https://thediplo-
mat.com/2016/07/south-china-sea-the-french-are-coming/.  
100. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, [1956] 2 Y.B. Int’l 
L. Comm’n 253, 265, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.l; DONALD R. ROTHWELL & 
TIM STEPHENS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 61–63 (2d ed. 2016); BROWN, supra 
note 3, at 43–51. The International Court of Justice has declared that the right of States to 
establish the breadth of their territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles 
under Article 3 of the Law of the Sea Convention reflects the current state of customary 
international law. See Nicaragua v. Colombia, supra note 40, ¶ 177. 
101. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 3. 
102. 2 MYRON H. NORDQUIST, SATYA NANDAN & SHABTAI ROSENNE, UNITED NA-
TIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY ¶ 3.8(b), at 81 
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concern is the absence of any universally accepted criteria for satisfying the 
requirements for the drawing of straight baselines, which are not formulated 
with geographical precision in the Convention.103 Indeed, in Fiscal Year 
2017, the U.S. Navy conducted FONOPs against excessive straight baselines 
drawn by Albania, Cambodia, China (around the Paracel Islands), Malta, 
Oman, Tunisia, and Vietnam.104 
Challenges to excessive maritime claims were more prevalent at the 
formative stage of the law of the sea regime. In the Fisheries case, from which 
the existing requirements for straight baselines originated, Professor 
Waldock, acting as counsel for the British government, argued that Norway’s 
claim to the extension of its maritime rights beyond those established under 
general international law “is not, in our view, opposable to any other State 
without its agreement.”105 The Court dismissed this argument on the grounds 
that the Norwegian practice of drawing straight baselines along a number of 
insular geographical formations—a practice known as “skjærgaard”—re-
ceived “the general toleration of the international community” and found 
that “Great Britain’s position in the North Sea, her own interest in the ques-
tion, and her prolonged abstention would in any case warrant Norway’s en-
forcement of her system against the United Kingdom.”106 Thus, Norway’s 
claim to straight baselines was upheld due to the absence of protest.  
On the other hand, the establishment of an exclusive fisheries zone ex-
tending to fifty nautical miles from baselines along the coast of Iceland was 
                                                                                                                      
(1993). For a discussion of the different types of excessive baseline claims, see ROACH & 
SMITH, supra note 16, at 72–133. 
103. See NORDQUIST, NANDAN & ROSENNE, supra note 102, ¶ 7.9(e), at 101–02. Article 
7(3) of the Law of the Sea Convention states: “The drawing of straight baselines must not 
depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast, and the sea areas 
lying within the lines must be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to 
the regime of internal waters.” LOSC, supra note 2, art. 7(3). For the U.S. position on the 
rules for the drawing of baselines, see J. Ashley Roach & Robert W. Smith, Straight Baselines: 
The Need for a Universally Applied Norm, 31 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 47 (2000). 
104. See ANNUAL FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION REPORT, supra note 6. 
105. Reply by Professor Waldock of United Kingdom, Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 
I.C.J. Pleadings 396 (Oct. 18, 1951). This argument drew on the Note, dated April 7, 1951, 
prepared by the French government with regard to the claims of various Latin American 
States to extend their territorial waters, which reads, in part: “Aucun État ne peut, par une 
déclaration unlatérale, étendre sa souveraineté sur la haute mer et rendre cette annexion opposable aux pays 
qui ont le droit d’invoquer le principe de la liberté des mers, tant que ces derniers ne l'auront pas formellement 
acceptée.” Id. at 605. 
106. Fisheries, supra note 20, at 139. 
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found “not opposable” to the United Kingdom in the Fisheries Jurisdiction 
judgment,107 rather than ipso jure illegal and invalid erga omnes.108 The Court’s 
rationale was grounded in the overriding norm of international law enshrined 
in Article 2 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas,109 which requires 
States to have due regard for each other’s interests. Iceland’s preferential 
rights in the distribution of fishery resources in the adjacent waters had to 
be balanced against Britain’s historic interests in fishing in Icelandic waters.110 
As Judge Dillard observed in his separate opinion, it was considered unnec-
essary for the Court to pronounce on the validity erga omnes of the exclusive 
fisheries jurisdiction under international law, in light of the way in which 
customary international law was evolving at that time.111 Adopting the same 
line of reasoning that he employed as counsel in the Fisheries case, Judge 
Waldock observed, “an extension of fisheries jurisdiction beyond twelve 
miles is not, in my opinion, opposable to another State unless shown to have 
been accepted or acquiesced in by that State.”112 However, the legal grounds 
of the judgment are specifically confined to the circumstances and special 
characteristics of the case.113 Thus, the Court’s decision is much narrower 
than Judge Waldock’s statement that no unilateral action can be opposable 
to another State without its acceptance or acquiescence. 
As the legal basis and limit of each maritime zone is now firmly estab-
lished under customary international law, as reflected in the Law of the Sea 
Convention, there is little scope for further unilateral extension of maritime 
rights that can be found opposable to other States as a new rule crystallizing 
into customary international law. There is no need to submit a formal pro-
test, from a legal point of view, to prevent the establishment of excessive 
maritime rights.114 However, when the cause of a dispute lies in disagreement 
                                                                                                                      
107. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 29 (July 25). 
108. Id. at 40 (declaration by Nagendra Singh, J.). 
109. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 
82. 
110. Fisheries Jurisdiction, supra note 107, at 29. 
111. Id. at 60 (separate opinion by Dillard, J.). Cf. R.R. Churchill, The Fisheries 
Jurisdiction Cases: The Contribution of the International Court of Justice to the Debate on Coastal 
States’ Fisheries Rights, 24 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 82, 
88–92 (1975). 
112. Fisheries Jurisdiction, supra note 107, at 120 (separate opinion by Waldock, 
J.). 
113. Id. at 45 (separate opinion by Forster, J., Bengzon, J., Jiménez de Aréchaga, 
J., Nagendra Singh, J., and Ruda, J.). 
114. Yehuda Z. Blum, The Gulf of Sidra Incident, 80 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 668, 674 (1986). 
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as to the interpretation or application of the terms of the treaty, protest may 
carry an evidentiary value in establishing that there is no general agreement 
in the subsequent practice of States in the sense of Article 31(3)(b) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.115 The absence of protest, on the 
other hand, may permit an inference that what is alleged to be an excessive 
maritime claim may have been accepted to confirm a particular interpretation 
of treaty terms.116 In any event, the legal risk of an expansive interpretation 
in favor of excessive maritime claims through subsequent practice should 
not be overstated as it must reflect “a common understanding” of the States 
parties as a whole.117 
This is not necessarily the case with regard to States that are not party to 
the Law of the Sea Convention.118 The validity of a treaty-based maritime 
claim against a non-party State may well be subject to challenge under cus-
tomary international law and the failure to protest could be considered as a 
form of acquiescence to the unilateral act designed to extend maritime 
claims, which might otherwise not be opposable to that non-party State.119 
This concern appears to undergird the U.S. position as the rationale for 
launching FONOP, as the U.S. had stated that it would not “acquiesce in 
unilateral acts of other States designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of 
the international community in navigation and overflight and other related 
high seas uses.”120 Although the freedom of navigation program commenced 
                                                                                                                      
115. Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 115 U.N.T.S. 331. 
116. See Beagle Channel Arbitration, supra note 24, ¶ 169(a). For a critical reflection, see 
D.W. Greig, The Beagle Channel Arbitration, 13 AUSTRALIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
Law 332, 361–67 (1977).  
117. See Nolte, supra note 90, ¶¶ 43–48; Georg Nolte (Special Rapporteur), First Report 
on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in relation to Treaty Interpretation, ¶¶ 91–110, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/660 (Mar. 19, 2013); Jean-Marc Sorel & Valérie Boré Eveno, 1969 Vienna 
Convention: Article 31 General Rule of Interpretation, in THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON THE 
LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 804, 825–29 (Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 
2011); Luigi Crema, Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice within and outside the Vienna 
Convention, in TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE 13, 16–23 (Georg Nolte ed., 2013); 
RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 256 (2d ed. 2015). 
118. Care must be exercised not to confuse the legal effect of protest in the context of 
a treaty regime with the legal effect of protest in the context of customary international law. 
These two distinct issues are often conflated in recent literature. See, e.g., LYNN KUOK, THE 
U.S. FON PROGRAM IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: A LAWFUL AND NECESSARY RESPONSE 
TO CHINA’S STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY 5 (2016).  
119. Dale Stephens, The Legal Efficacy of Freedom of Navigation Assertions, 80 INTER-
NATIONAL LAW STUDIES 235, 244–46 (2006). 
120. Statement on United States Oceans Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 378–79 (Mar. 10, 
1983), reprinted in 22 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 464 (1983).  
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before the Law of the Sea Convention was finalized for adoption,121 it has 
continued to be relevant given that as a non-party to the Convention, the 
United States remains vulnerable to the doctrine of acquiescence in relation 
to excessive maritime claims. 
 
IV. THE LEGAL EFFECT OF THE REGIME OF INNOCENT PASSAGE IN      
DISPUTED WATERS 
 
The applicability of the regime of innocent passage hinges upon the validity 
of sovereign authority, ipso jure, to control the territorial sea adjacent to a 
State’s territory. But when the State exercises sovereign control, ipso facto, 
over a disputed maritime area as its territorial sea, the application of the re-
gime of innocent passage is subject to challenge by contesting States. To the 
extent that the regime of innocent passage is applied in disputed waters, its 
application to the contesting State or third States needs to be reconciled with 
their legitimate interest of contesting territorial title or asserting freedom of 
navigation until the dispute is settled in one way or another. This Part first 
examines the irreconcilable tension between the act of challenging a claim of 
sovereignty and innocent passage, before turning to how the concept of op-
posability helps clarify the legal effect of the regime of innocent passage 
when it is applied in disputed waters. 
 
A. Is Challenging a Claim of Sovereignty an Innocent Passage? 
 
Innocent passage is defined in Articles 18 and 19 of the Law of the Sea Con-
vention as the passage—the continuous and expeditious navigation for the 
purpose of traversing the territorial sea or proceeding to or from internal 
waters, a call at such roadstead or port facility—of a foreign ship that is “not 
                                                                                                                      
121. It was launched in 1979 during the final year of the Carter administration. For 
the origins and historical development of the freedom of navigation program, see, for 
example, JAMES KRASKA, MARITIME POWER AND THE LAW OF THE SEA: EXPEDITIONARY 
OPERATIONS IN WORLD POLITICS 397–403 (2011); William J. Aceves, The Freedom of 
Navigation Program: A Study of the Relationship Between Law and Politics, 19 HASTINGS INTERNA-
TIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW 259, 277–87 (1995); Stephen A. Rose, Naval Ac-
tivity in the EEZ – Troubled Waters Ahead?, 39 NAVAL LAW REVIEW 67, 85–90 (1990); George 
Galdorisi, The United States Freedom of Navigation Program: A Bridge for International Compliance 
with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea?, 27 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 399, 401–03 (1996). 
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prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.”122 The 
catalogue of non-innocent activities found in Article 19 reflects those activ-
ities over which the coastal State may exercise its sovereignty through the 
adoption of domestic laws and regulations.123 It follows that from the coastal 
State’s point of view, any act of challenging its sovereignty—whether con-
testing territorial title, disputing the legal classification of a maritime feature, 
or the manner in which the baselines are drawn—will be deemed prejudicial 
to its peace, good order, or security. However, from the contesting State’s 
point of view, there is no application of the regime of innocent passage in 
the first place since it denies the coastal State’s sovereign entitlement to a 
territorial sea in the disputed maritime area. 
In the Corfu Channel case, the International Court of Justice discussed 
whether a passage with a political mission—in this case, to test Albania’s 
attitude toward the passage of foreign vessels—could qualify as an innocent 
passage.124 In its judgment, the Court observed: 
 
The legality of this measure taken by the Government of the United King-
dom cannot be disputed, provided that it was carried out in a manner con-
sistent with the requirements of international law [i.e., innocent passage]. 
The “mission” was designed to affirm a right which had been unjustly de-
nied. The Government of the United Kingdom was not bound to abstain 
from exercising its right of passage, which the Albanian Government had 
illegally denied.125 
 
The Court then examined whether the manner in which the British warships 
carried out their passage was consistent with the requirements for innocent 
                                                                                                                      
122. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 19(1). For an exhaustive list of activities incompatible with 
innocent passage, see id. art. 19(2). See also U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST 
GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCTP 11-10B/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS § 2.5.2.1 (2017); CHURCHILL & LOWE, 
supra note 51, at 86; Richard A. Barnes, Innocent Passage in the Territorial Sea, in UNITED 
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A COMMENTARY 176, 190–96 (Al-
exander Proelss ed., 2017). 
123. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 21. See K. Hakapää & E.J. Molenaar, Innocent Passage – Past 
and Present, 23 MARINE POLICY 131, 135–37 (1999); O’CONNELL, supra note 19, at 270. 
124. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4 (Apr. 9). 
125. Id. at 30. 
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passage.126 This indicates that the regime of innocent passage does not pre-
vent the contesting State from carrying out a passage as a means to assert 
the right disputed or wrongly denied by the coastal State, unless the passage 
is carried out as part of, or incidental to, usurpation of the coastal State’s 
sovereignty or interference therewith.127 
The question is whether the same interpretation extends to the assertion 
of freedom of navigation in challenging claims of sovereignty or sovereign 
entitlement to a territorial sea. The act of challenging a claim of sovereignty 
may take a variety of forms, ranging from a diplomatic protest to a naval 
operation. It is the manner in which the passage is carried out, not the polit-
ical motive or objective of the passage that determines its conformity with 
the regime of innocent passage. The passage will not be deemed innocent if, 
for instance, the act of challenging sovereignty involves a military exercise, 
deployment of military aircraft, or interference with the coastal State’s com-
munication system,128 even though the challenging State may consider these 
acts a legitimate exercise of the freedom of navigation. Moreover, when 
these activities are intended to change the outcome of the dispute with an-
other State by force, the passage will not only be deemed non-innocent, but 
will also constitute an unlawful use of force against the challenged State.129 
This is because, despite the fact that the claim of sovereignty itself is in dis-
pute, the prohibition of the threat or use of force extends to where force is 
used “as a means of solving international disputes, including territorial dis-
putes and problems concerning frontiers of States.”130 
                                                                                                                      
126. The Court, however, abstained from considering a more general question regard-
ing the right of warships to innocent passage in the territorial sea of a foreign State not 
forming an international strait. Id. 
127. See G. G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: 
General Principles and Substantive Law, 27 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
1, 28–31 (1950). 
128. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 19(2)(b), (e), (f), (k). 
129. Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. 
Nicar.) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicar. v. Costa 
Rica), 2015 I.C.J. Rep. 665, 1, 4, ¶ 12 (Dec. 16) (separate opinion by Owada, J.) [hereinafter 
Costa Rica v. Nicaragua] (noting that Judge Owada’s separate opinion is not consecutively 
paginated from the decision); id. at 1, 13, ¶ 55 (separate opinion by Robinson, J.) (noting 
that Judge Robinson’s separate opinion is not consecutively paginated from the decision); 
Corfu Channel, supra note 124, at 35. 
130. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), ¶ 4, Declaration on Principles of International Law con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970). 
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The mere traversing of warships or government vessels, on the other 
hand, is considered by most commentators to be consistent with the require-
ments for innocent passage.131 As such, the innocent passage of warships and 
government vessels will not be characterized as an act challenging the coastal 
State’s claim of sovereignty to the territory or territorial sea, although it can 
be an effective protest against any infringement or restriction upon the right 
of innocent passage.132 Different views have been expressed as to whether a 
passage involving a violation of the rules and regulations of the coastal State 
necessarily renders it non-innocent.133 Given the contested status of sover-
eignty, there is little support for rendering a passage non-innocent when it 
merely breaches a State’s rules and regulations. 
Controversies are more likely to arise in cases where the act of challeng-
ing a claim of sovereignty to the disputed waters involves a non-innocent 
passage or an overflight below the threshold of a threat or use of force. For 
instance, an assertive passage could involve passive listening or monitoring 
activities to gauge the operating frequencies and radar coverage installed on 
a disputed territory,134 or a geological survey to gather tidal data in the area 
surrounding a maritime feature of disputable classification.135 While non-in-
nocent under the regime of innocent passage, these activities may well be 
considered a legitimate exercise to challenge claims of sovereignty. The sig-
nificance of such activities cannot be understated as evidence to rebut the 
presumption of acquiescence in what would otherwise be a continuous and 
peaceful exercise of sovereign authority by the occupying State. Thus, in 
Pedra Branca, Singapore’s decisions granting Malaysian officials permission to 
                                                                                                                      
131. See supra note 12. For deviations in State practice, see Hakapää & Molenaar, supra 
note 123, at 143. Innocent passage of warships as customary international law is therefore 
contentious. See BROWN, supra note 3, at 64–72. 
132. See John C. Hitt, Jr., Oceans Law and Superpower Relations: The Bumping of the Yorktown 
and the Caron in the Black Sea, 29 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 713, 733–36 
(1989). On the bumping incident in the Black Sea, see also John W. Rolph, Freedom of 
Navigation and the Black Sea Bumping Incident: How “Innocent” Must Innocent Passage Be?, 135 
MILITARY LAW REVIEW 137 (1992). 
133. Compare Agyebeng, supra note 3, at 384, and NGANTCHA, supra note 3, at 176, with 
Guang, supra note 3, at 113, and Froman, supra note 12, at 660. 
134. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 19(2)(c). This provision is also referred to as the 
“Pueblo” clause. See W.E. Butler, Innocent Passage and the 1982 Convention: The Influence of 
Soviet Law and Policy, 81 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 331, 345 (1987). 
But see KRASKA, supra note 121, at 121–22 (setting forth the view of the U.S. govern-
ment that the regime of innocent passage does not adversely affect a maritime State’s 
intelligence gathering activities). 
135. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 19(2)(j). 
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conduct surveys of the waters surrounding the disputed island were seen as 
conduct à titre de souverain.136 In contrast, conducting these surveys without 
seeking permission from Singapore would have constituted non-innocent 
passage had that regime applied. 
 
B. The Opposability of the Regime of Innocent Passage to Contesters 
 
Given that the applicability of the innocent passage regime itself is uncertain 
in disputed waters, the legality of a non-innocent passage or an overflight 
will remain unresolved until the root cause of the dispute is settled. It is well 
established that upon settlement of the dispute, each party is under an obli-
gation to withdraw any military or police forces and its civil administration 
from areas that are declared to be within the sovereign territory of the other 
party.137 Questions remain, however, as to the wrongfulness of the act that 
was committed prior to the settlement of the territorial and maritime dispute. 
Could the lawfulness of an assertive passage or an overflight be retroactively 
assessed according to the ruling on the validity of the occupying State’s ter-
ritorial title or maritime claim to a territorial sea? Or, given the contested 
status of sovereignty, would an assertive passage or overflight not constitute 
a breach of sovereignty, even though the occupying State may perceive the 
act as such due to failure to satisfy the requirements for innocent passage? 
The legality of assertive passage and overflight in disputed waters forms 
part of a broader question of State responsibility arising from conduct à titre 
de souverain in territorial disputes. The International Court of Justice has been 
inconsistent with regard to the legal consequences of conduct occurring in a 
disputed area prior to the settlement of the dispute. In its 2002 Cameroon v. 
Nigeria judgment, the Court abstained from ruling on the responsibility of 
either party to the dispute, stating: 
 
In the circumstances of the case, the Court considers moreover that, by the 
very fact of the present Judgment and of the evacuation of the Came-
roonian territory occupied by Nigeria, the injury suffered by Cameroon by 
reason of the occupation of its territory will in all events have been suffi-
ciently addressed. The Court will not therefore seek to ascertain whether 
                                                                                                                      
136. Sovereignty over Pedra Branca, supra note 58, ¶ 239. 
137. Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. 
Nigeria; Eq. Guinea intervening), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 303, ¶ 315 (Oct. 10) [herein-
after Cameroon v. Nigeria]; Temple of Preah Vihear, supra note 65, at 37. 
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and to what extent Nigeria’s responsibility to Cameroon has been engaged 
as a result of that occupation.138 
 
By contrast, in Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, the Court found that Nicaragua had 
violated Costa Rica’s territorial sovereignty by carrying out various activities, 
such as establishing a military presence, in parts of the disputed territory.139 
In making this finding, the Court did not consider the fact that Nicaragua 
was contesting sovereignty over the disputed territory. 
It is possible that the Court found that Costa Rica had conclusively 
proven its legal title to the disputed territory through the 1858 Treaty of 
Territorial Limits,140 particularly as subsequent arbitral awards clarified this 
position.141 Under this view, Nicaragua’s activities in the area would have no 
basis for a claim of sovereignty that could be made in good faith.142 This 
construction is indeed justified as an essential requirement of stability, draw-
ing on Lauterpacht’s observation cited earlier.143 Further, this requirement is 
reflected in the Court’s jurisprudence, which favors a treaty-based title over 
an effective exercise of sovereign authority.144 The principle of good faith 
also requires the State contesting territorial title to protest as soon as it real-
izes that the action taken by another State may be prejudicial to its rights.145 
Nevertheless, the way in which the Court relies upon its earlier judgment 
on the boundary dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria to abstain from 
ruling on Costa Rica’s submission concerning an unlawful use of force is 
curious. While acknowledging “[t]he fact that Nicaragua considered that its 
                                                                                                                      
138. Cameroon v. Nigeria, supra note 137, ¶ 319. 
139. Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, supra note 129, ¶ 93. 
140. Treaty of Territorial Limits between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, Apr. 15, 1858, 
118 CTS 439. 
141. Award in regard to the Validity of the Treaty of Limits between Costa Rica 
and Nicaragua of 15 July 1858 (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), 28 R.I.A.A. 189 (Arb. 1888–97). 
142. This appreciation of the nature of the dispute is implicit in the language of 
the judgment. See Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, supra note 129, at 3, ¶ 9 (separate opinion 
by Owada, J.). 
143. Lauterpacht, supra note 88, at 396. 
144. See, e.g., Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Niger), Judgment, 2013 I.C.J. Rep. 
44, ¶ 79 (Apr. 16); Cameroon v. Nigeria, supra note 137, ¶ 68; Benin v. Niger, supra note 
61, ¶ 141; Libya v. Chad, supra note 70, at ¶¶ 75–76; Burkina Faso v. Mali, supra note 
58, ¶ 63; Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belg. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1959 I.C.J. 
Rep. 209, 227–30 (June 20). 
145. See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text. See also ROBERT KOLB, GOOD 
FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 127–29 (2017). 
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activities were taking place on its own territory does not exclude the possi-
bility of characterizing them as an unlawful use of force,” the Court found 
that it “need not dwell any further on this submission.”146 Judge Owada ob-
serves in his separate opinion that the reference to Cameroon v. Nigeria “could 
be quite misleading,” as that case did not arise from the unilateral action of 
one party to forcefully alter the status quo.147 As discussed above, the prohi-
bition of the threat or use of force operates irrespective of the validity of the 
territorial title or maritime claim. The fact that a State engages in assertive 
activities for the legitimate purpose of contesting territorial title or maritime 
claim, on the other hand, could exclude the possibility of characterizing them 
as a violation of sovereignty. 
Given the general uncertainty as to the legality of assertive passage and 
overflight in disputed waters, an individual assessment of whether the appli-
cation of the regime of innocent passage is “opposable” in the specific con-
text of each dispute to other States provides the best approach for resolution. 
The concept of opposability was originally employed in international law as 
a methodological aid to judicial reasoning when a unilateral act or a treaty 
rule was invoked against a third party at a time when its general applicability 
under customary international law was yet to be established.148 This concept 
provides judicial institutions with a qualified means to determine the legal 
effect of a unilateral act of one State against another inter se, without making 
a generalized statement about its validity or applicability erga omnes.149 At pre-
sent, the regime of innocent passage in the territorial seas of coastal States is 
well established under customary international law, but its validity and ap-
plicability erga omnes is brought into question when the very basis for exercis-
ing sovereign authority over a territorial sea is subject to legitimate challenge. 
In a situation where the regime of innocent passage is applied in disputed 
waters, its legal effect is not amenable to any general pronouncement, but 
rather requires qualified assessment on an individual basis. 
It is thus submitted that the legal consequences of a passage of foreign-
flagged vessels, as well as their associated activities, in disputed waters are to 
                                                                                                                      
146. Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, supra note 129, ¶ 97. 
147. Id. at 4, ¶ 12 (separate opinion by Owada, J). 
148. See Burkina Faso v. Mali, supra note 58, ¶¶ 46, 48–50; North Sea Continental Shelf, 
supra note 14, ¶¶ 60, 69, 83; Nottebohm Case (Second Phase) (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 
1955 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 34, 39–44 (Apr. 6) (separate opinion by Read, J.). For a discussion of 
opposability in the Fisheries and Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, see supra notes 105–113 and ac-
companying text. 
149. J.G. Starke, The Concept of Opposability in International Law, 2 AUSTRALIAN YEAR-
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL Law 1, 3–4 (1968). 
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be assessed vis-à-vis the legal position of the States concerned in the context 
of each dispute. The regime of innocent passage is not opposable to a State 
that persistently engages in assertive passage or overflight for the legitimate 
purpose of contesting territorial title or maritime claim to a territorial sea in 
good faith. When the fundamental legal basis for claiming a territorial sea is 
contested, the applicability of the regime of innocent passage is dependent 
upon the extent to which acquiescence forms a constituent element of per-
fecting territorial title or maritime claim to a territorial sea under customary 
international law.150 To the extent it does, the absence of protest carries con-
siderable, if not conclusive, probative value as evidence of acquiescence, 
which may prevent other States from challenging the validity of the legal 
claim laid over the disputed territory and maritime area. Such legal conse-
quences can be precluded when an assertive passage or overflight occurs in 
or over disputed waters, with a view to challenging the exercise of sovereign 
authority or collecting evidence relevant to the territorial or maritime claim. 
Such passage or overflight is considered a legitimate act of sovereignty to 
which the regime of innocent passage is not deemed opposable.151 
State practice, however, often contradicts this operation of law by im-
posing the regime of innocent passage in an exercise of State sovereignty 
over the disputed area. This is what Japan does in relation to Di-
aoyu/Senkaku Islands, what China does with a degree of ambiguity in the 
South China Sea, and what Indonesia did in relation to East Timor when it 
was under Indonesia’s occupation.152 And this is indeed what international 
law jurisprudence requires States do to demonstrate their conduct à titre de 
souverain, particularly when the legal basis of their claim rests on historic or 
prescriptive title to the disputed territory.153 
The regime of innocent passage is likely to be found opposable, on the 
other hand, when a State, due to the absence of protest, is deemed to have 
acquiesced in the territorial or maritime claim of the coastal State under cus-
tomary international law, or against a third State that complies with the re-
quirements of innocent passage without any involvement in the dispute. The 
purported exercise of sovereign authority generates legal effects relative to 
                                                                                                                      
150. See supra Sections III.A–B. 
151. A similar argument was made by Qatar, which relied on its repeated protests 
against Bahrain’s “unlawful occupation” as evidence that “at no time did Qatar acqui-
esce in the attribution of the Hawar Islands to Bahrain, and that this attribution was 
therefore not opposable to it.” Qatar v. Bahrain, supra note 1, ¶ 106 (emphasis added). 
152. See infra note 162 and accompanying text. 
153. See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text. 
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individual States that fail to challenge the exercise of sovereignty. However, 
these legal effects are distinct from the formation of subsequent practice as 
an aid to treaty interpretation, when the dispute solely concerns an interpre-
tation or application of a treaty provision in a specific context.154 The absence 
of protest or ignorant compliance with the application of the regime of in-
nocent passage carries little legal value in resolving interpretive disputes un-
less the practice reflects “a common understanding” of the States parties as 
a whole.155 
The remaining contentious question is whether the regime of innocent 
passage would be opposable to a third State that does not contest sovereignty 
but is not prepared to recognize any title while the dispute remains unre-
solved.156 The answer to this question will depend upon which of the theses 
discussed above regarding the principle of domination of the land over the 
sea prevails. If the first thesis of the principle is strictly followed, no sover-
eign entitlement to a territorial sea can be established until the territorial dis-
pute is settled. Under this thesis, the waters will remain high seas in which 
the freedom of navigation and overflight may be exercised. An emphasis on 
the second thesis of the principle is more likely to support the application of 
the regime of innocent passage based on geographical conditions that satisfy 
the requirements for generating a territorial sea.157 A clearer basis for territo-
rial title, for instance a treaty-based title, rather than a prescriptive or historic 
title, is likely to buttress the legitimacy of the exercise of sovereign authority 
to apply the regime of innocent passage and to render it opposable to other 
States. 
 
V. LEGAL POLICY EVALUATION IN THE INTEREST OF INTERNATIONAL 
PEACE AND SECURITY 
 
The conclusions reached above regarding the applicability of the regime of 
innocent passage, and the variations in its legal effect, are grounded in the 
analysis of jurisprudence developed by international courts and tribunals. 
The efficacy of these findings rests on whether the regime of innocent pas-
sage, thus applied or otherwise, is operationalized in a manner that provides 
                                                                                                                      
154. See supra Section III.C. 
155. See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text. 
156. Recognition of a situation by third States may assist and accelerate the process of 
consolidation of a title. See JENNINGS, supra note 59, at 26, 40–41. 
157. South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 80, ¶¶ 333–84. 
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sufficient legal policy incentive for States to restrain themselves from unnec-
essarily engaging in assertive passage in disputed waters,158 while at the same 
time leaving a reasonable scope for contesting territorial title or maritime 
claim to a territorial sea when there is a legitimate basis for it. To that end, 
legal policy concerns of each party to a territorial or maritime dispute, as well 
as those of third parties, need to be fully taken into account in assessing 
whether the findings strike a reasonable balance in the interest of maintain-
ing international peace and security. 
The most significant limit to assertive passage or overflight is the prohi-
bition on the threat or use of force. Any activity involving a threat or use of 
force is prohibited under customary international law,159 and will have no 
bearing upon the validity of territorial title or maritime claim to a territorial 
sea in dispute. As Judge Robinson observes in his separate opinion in Nica-
ragua v. Costa Rica, territorial disputes are “one of the most sensitive catego-
ries of international relations and particularly prone to provoking the use of 
force by States.”160 Therefore, any military operation to challenge the effec-
tive control over the territory or maritime area in dispute, including the laying 
of naval mines to deny access to the disputed territory or waters,161 is cate-
gorically prohibited and in violation of the peremptory norm of settling in-
ternational disputes through peaceful means—irrespective of whether the 
regime of innocent passage applies or is opposable. 
The primary concern of coastal States exercising sovereign authority in 
disputed waters is the risk of forceful takeover of effective control under the 
guise of a legitimate sovereign act of contesting territorial title or conducting 
freedom of navigation and overflight operations. It is certainly conceivable 
that a coastal State involved in a territorial or maritime dispute with another 
State would enforce the regime of innocent passage by denying access to any 
vessels that challenge its sovereign authority. For instance, in 1988, Indone-
sia denied passage by closing the Sunda and Lombok straits to the Lusitania 
Expresso, a Portuguese registered car ferry carrying peace activists who were 
                                                                                                                      
158. Cf. Botswana v. Namibia, supra note 61, at 1112 (declaration by Koroma, J.) (“[T]he 
Court is entitled to lay down terms which not only determine the boundary as such but 
would contribute to the peace and stability between the two States.”). 
159. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 187–90 (June 27). 
160. Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, supra note 129, at 16–17, ¶ 64 (separate opinion by 
Robinson, J.). 
161. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note 159, 
¶¶ 213–15 (noting that it also prejudices the right of access to the port enjoyed by 
foreign ships). 
 
 
 
Innocent Passage in Disputed Waters  Vol. 94 
279 
 
 
 
 
 
 
highlighting human rights abuses in East Timor over which Indonesia’s sov-
ereignty was disputed.162 To hold that the regime of innocent passage is not 
opposable to any State contesting the coastal State’s territorial title or mari-
time claim to a territorial sea does not bode well for the coastal State and its 
interest in safeguarding the effective exercise of its sovereignty. 
On the other hand, in contesting the territorial title claimed by the coastal 
State, protests are necessary to preserve the rights of the contesting State by 
rebutting the presumption of acquiescence and to prevent the consolidation 
of prescriptive or historic title. The protest must be effective in that mere 
periodical and ineffectual diplomatic protests cannot satisfy the requirement, 
particularly in cases where these are contradicted by, or inconsistent with, 
other acts of the protesting State. Such contradictory or inconsistent acts 
include omissions or failure to perform certain actions,163 such as referring 
the dispute to a judicial institution for settlement when that option is availa-
ble.164 This does not mean that the protest must involve an attempt to take 
physical control of the disputed territory or any other measures that would 
provoke violence.165 However, there is uncertainty as to which act of protest 
would be considered effective under the attendant circumstances, with dif-
ferent views expressed on the question.166 In addition, the concept of critical 
date has been ineffective in determining when States may stop protesting to 
prevent further escalation of tension after the dispute has been crystallized 
due to the vague, and even arbitrary criteria that have been applied for the 
determination of that date.167 Due to these uncertainties, the contesting State 
                                                                                                                      
162. For a detailed analysis, see Donald R. Rothwell, Coastal State Sovereignty and 
Innocent Passage: The Voyage of the Lusitania Expresso, 16 MARINE POLICY 427 (1992). 
163. Fitzmaurice, supra note 60, at 64 n.1. 
164. Minquiers and Ecrehos, supra note 26, at 107–08 (individual opinion by Carneiro, 
J.). However, Fitzmaurice noted that “once arbitration or judicial settlement has been pro-
posed, and rejected, or not taken up by the acquiring State, continued protest, even if only diplo-
matic, will retain all its preventive force.” Fitzmaurice, supra note 75, at 29 n.3. 
165. Chamizal (U.S. v. Mex.), 11 R.I.A.A. 309, 329 (Int’l Boundary Comm’n 1911), 
reprinted in 5 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 782, 806 (1911) (observing 
“however much the Mexicans may have desired to take physical possession of the district, 
the result of any attempt to do so would have provoked scenes of violence and the Republic 
of Mexico cannot be blamed for resorting to the milder forms of protest contained in its 
diplomatic correspondence.”). 
166. See, e.g., John M. van Dyke, Legal Issues Related to Sovereignty over Dokdo and Its Maritime 
Boundary, 38 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 157, 188–92 (2007); Mac-
Gibbon, Some Observations on the Part of Protest in International Law, supra note 67, at 309–10; 
Johnson, Acquisitive Prescription in International Law, supra note 86, at 353–54. 
167. Nasu & Rothwell, supra note 59, at 67–68. 
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would be inclined to be more provocative than necessary, which tends to 
fuel confrontation and risks the escalation of hostilities. To hold that the 
regime of innocent passage is not opposable to the contesting State that has 
been making effective protest would encourage States to be more provoca-
tive with assertive passage and overflight in disputed waters, which neces-
sarily creates tension and may endanger the maintenance of international 
peace and security. 
Maritime States challenging the sovereign claim to a territorial sea adja-
cent to a maritime feature of disputable geographical condition, or an exces-
sive territorial sea resulting from unlawful baselines, may decide to assert 
freedom of navigation rights in disputed maritime areas. This is particularly 
important when there is a potential for the coastal State justifying the sover-
eign entitlement to the disputed waters under customary international law. 
The failure to protest operates in a similar manner to affect the formation of 
customary international law and the scope of its binding force,168 again with 
different views as to what constitutes effective protest.169 To hold that the 
regime of innocent passage is opposable to a State when it is deemed, due to 
the absence of protest, to have acquiesced in the territorial or maritime claim 
of the coastal State under customary international law, or to a third State that 
complies with the requirements for innocent passage without any involve-
ment in the dispute, is likely to demand of every maritime State an immediate 
policy decision as to whether they should engage in—or abstain from—as-
sertive passage or overflight in disputed waters. Given the non-innocent na-
ture of such activities, the coastal State will necessarily regard it as violation 
of its sovereignty. 
The strict application of the earlier conclusions appears, therefore, to 
lead the disputing States on a collision course, with an inflated risk of esca-
lation of hostilities. This undesired likelihood suggests that the extension of 
existing jurisprudence to the issues of navigation in disputed waters does not 
further the maintenance of international peace and security. Legal policy 
considerations may thus demand certain qualifications on the conclusions 
                                                                                                                      
168. See, e.g., Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur), Third Report on Identification of Customary 
International Law, 9–14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/682 (Mar. 27, 2015); 1 CUSTOMARY INTER-
NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, at xlv–xlvi (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Dos-
wald-Beck eds., 2005); I.C. MacGibbon, Customary International Law and Acquiescence, 33 
BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 115 (1957). 
169. Compare Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRITISH 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 39–41 (1976), with ANTHONY D’AMATO, THE 
CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 89, 101–02 (1971). 
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regarding the opposability of the regime of innocent passage. Accordingly, 
conscientious jurists could be inclined to hold the regime of innocent pas-
sage non-opposable to another State to the extent that assertive passage is 
conducted as strictly necessary to display protest or collect evidence relevant 
to the territorial or maritime claim. It follows that the regime of innocent 
passage will be deemed opposable when the contesting State engages in 
overly assertive passage, that is, navigation or overflight not strictly required 
for legitimate purposes, such as conducting military exercises and maneuvers 
considered to be non-innocent. 
The same considerations would also motivate conscientious jurists to 
support the claimed application of the regime of innocent passage without 
prejudice to the outcome of the dispute. They might pronounce that it is 
opposable to third states whether or not they are prepared to recognize the 
territorial sea in a disputed maritime area, but to the extent that it does not 
prevent them from engaging in assertive passage as strictly necessary to chal-
lenge the validity of the legal claim laid over the area. An obvious concern 
that arises from the perspective of the contesting State is that the enforce-
ment of the regime of innocent passage could be regarded as conduct à titre 
de souverain, which favors the sovereignty claim of the occupying power. 
Greater care would therefore be required in treating certain purported exer-
cises of sovereign authority, for instance, naval patrol, and granting approval 
for various maritime activities in disputed waters as evidence of a continuous 
and peaceful display of sovereignty. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Despite detailed codification of the international law of the sea, doctrinal 
uncertainty persists at the edges of the maritime domain where it intersects 
with the land domain. The traditional principle, “the land dominates the sea,” 
remains cardinal to the legal relationship between the two domains, but its 
role as the legal basis for attribution of maritime entitlement (first thesis) has 
subsided as the law of the sea regime has established itself as a distinct field 
of international law. Under the law of the sea regime, the principle of domi-
nation of the land over the sea has been embedded in specific rules, with its 
emphasis being shifted to geographical conditions in determining the extent 
of maritime zones (second thesis). Jurisprudence oscillates between these 
two aspects of the principle when applied to specific disputed legal claims to 
territorial title or maritime entitlement. As the analysis above has demon-
strated, this doctrinal uncertainty has failed to clarify whether and how the 
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regime of innocent passage might apply in disputed waters. This article has 
presented a solution by resuscitating the concept of opposability as a means 
of assessing the applicability of the regime, and its legal effect, in the specific 
context of a particular dispute. 
In cases where title to coastal land itself is in dispute, the applicability of 
the regime of innocent passage is dependent upon the extent to which the 
claim of sovereignty over the disputed territory is opposable to maritime 
States. The regime of innocent passage is not opposable to the contesting 
State that persistently engages in assertive passage or overflight to rebut the 
presumption of acquiescence when it does so in good faith for the legitimate 
purpose of contesting territorial title. It is also arguable that the regime is not 
opposable to third States that assert freedom of navigation while the dispute 
remains unsettled. However, in the interest of international peace and secu-
rity, this operation of law should be qualified so that the regime of innocent 
passage is deemed non-opposable to another State only to the extent that 
assertive passage is conducted as strictly necessary to display protest or col-
lect evidence relevant to the latter State’s territorial or maritime claim. 
When the legal classification of a maritime feature is challenged due to 
its disputable geographical condition, the applicability of the regime of inno-
cent passage is dependent upon the extent to which acquiescence forms a 
constituent element of perfecting title over that feature, and the maritime 
claim to an adjacent territorial sea under customary international law. To the 
extent that it does, the regime of innocent passage will not be deemed to be 
opposable to another State that engages in assertive passage to challenge the 
validity of the legal claim laid over the maritime feature of disputable classi-
fication and adjacent waters. The purported exercise of sovereign authority 
arguably generates legal effects relative to individual States that fail to chal-
lenge the exercise of sovereignty before the claim consolidates into valid title 
under the residual rule of customary international law. 
On the other hand, when the dispute concerning maritime claims solely 
involves disagreement as to the interpretation or application of the terms of 
the Law of the Sea Convention, the regime of innocent passage will be 
deemed opposable to third States to the extent that it does not prevent them 
from engaging in assertive passage as strictly necessary to challenge the va-
lidity of the legal claim laid over the disputed maritime area. The absence of 
protest or ignorant compliance with the purported application of the regime 
of innocent passage in disputed waters is not decisive in resolving interpre-
tive disputes, but protest may carry an evidentiary value in establishing that 
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there is no “general agreement” in the subsequent practice of the States par-
ties as a whole. However, the legal stability afforded by the treaty regime 
does not extend to non-party States, such as the United States, which remain 
vulnerable to the presumption of acquiescence in the unilateral act of ex-
tending maritime claims. The regime of innocent passage, as it applies under 
customary international law, will likely be deemed opposable to non-party 
States if they are found to have failed to make an effective protest. 
These conclusions are primarily based on the doctrinal analysis of the 
existing rules of international law and relevant jurisprudence, with a critical 
evaluation from a legal policy perspective in the interest of the maintenance 
of international peace and security. The doctrinal analysis suggests that, de-
spite modern advancement in codification and judicial mechanisms for dis-
pute settlement, international law remains a legal system that relies upon re-
sort to self-help by States in reserving and asserting their rights so long as it 
does not involve a threat or use of force against another State. A relevant 
question for scholars and practitioners of international law is to what extent 
the existing system of international law succeeds in stemming legal incentives 
for resorting to unilateral acts of self-help. It is not helpful, in this respect, 
to leave unresolved doctrinal uncertainties, such as what constitutes effective 
protest necessary to rebut the presumption of acquiescence, whether the ex-
ercise of contested maritime rights should be taken into account as conduct 
à titre de souverain in the settlement of a territorial dispute, and how the con-
cept of critical date is to be applied. 
 
